Abstract-The increasing prevalence of mobile malware has driven the need for emulated, dynamic analysis techniques. Unfortunately, emulating mobile devices is nontrivial because of the different types of hardware features onboard (e.g., sensors) and the manner in which users interact with their devices as compared to traditional computing platforms. To evaluate this, our research focuses on the enumeration and comparison of multiple attributes and event values from sensors and dynamic resources on Android runtime environments, both from physical devices and online analysis services. Utilizing our results from enumeration, we develop two different Android applications that are successful in detecting and evading the emulated environments utilized by those mobile analysis services during execution. When ran on physical devices, the same applications successfully perform a pseudomalware action and send device identifying information to our server.
I. INTRODUCTION
Emulating mobile devices is nontrivial because of the different types of hardware features onboard (e.g., sensors) and the manner in which users interact with their devices' resources as compared to traditional computing platforms. Mobile malware authors recognize these challenges and are using these to evade detection and defeat the security roadblocks they encounter. Part of their success in doing so comes from the inherent characteristics of mobile devices themselves. Challenges in static analysis of malware have stimulated the need for emulated, dynamic analysis techniques.
A. Motivation and Goals
Modern mobile devices now come outfitted with a variety of hardware and sensors that users can tap into for sending and receiving input, or to monitor for state changes so as to perform some specified action. Mobile applications are becoming so dependent on these additional sensors and hardware features that we have come to expect their availability-so much so it has created new paradigms in programming (e.g., context-aware programming) [1] .
Unfortunately, context-aware programming and the application programming interfaces (APIs) that enable such functionality also allow for malicious, context-aware attacks on mobile devices. Most mobile users can envision how a proximity or location-based attack from a malicious application could be triggered; however, it is just as feasible that the trigger could come from an audio cue, the snapping of a photo, or a change in acceleration indicating the device's owner is traveling by vehicle vice walking.
Equally possible is sensor functionality being utilized for evasion of malware analysis. Our work highlights the challenges faced in conducting dynamic malware analysiscommonly referred to as runtime or sandboxed analysis-by exploring how sensor and other resource-based state changes can be leveraged to evade dynamic analysis tools and services through detection.
Our research efforts were specifically designed with the following questions in mind:
1. Can dynamic analysis tools and services be enumerated (i.e., fingerprinted) through sensors and dynamic resources they simulate, how they simulate them, and which ones they are unable to simulate?
2. In what ways can malicious behavior on mobile devices be triggered by sequences of sensor-based or resourcebased state changes (i.e., a mobile konami code)?
3. Can these types of triggering techniques be used to defeat common dynamic analysis tools and services for detecting malware?
B. Scope of Research
Our research focuses on the development and testing of multiple Android proof-of-concept applications for enumeration and evasion. Although this work is applicable to other mobile platforms, our focus remained on Android rather than being all-inclusive of others such as iOS, Blackberry 10, or Windows Phone.
The proof-of-concept applications were tested against multiple physical devices, as well as multiple mobile malware analysis services, which we became familiar with during an initial literature review. We did not attempt to exploit any known (or unknown) vulnerabilities within the Android platform during our testing, nor within the analysis services that we tested against.
II. ANDROID APPLICATION COMPONENT OVERVIEW
In order to understand the difference between the attack surfaces on traditional software applications and Android applications, one needs to understand the basic components that comprise an Android app. Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, and Content Providers all offer unique functionality that malware developers have learned to repurpose for malicious means. Additional details regarding these components can be found on the Android Developers website.
Activities can be thought of as a container for the user interface of a single page or screen of an app. Activities are typically tied to layouts and house the buttons, widgets, content, and images seen by a user during the Activity's life cycle.
Services are components which do not have a user interface element, but instead are utilized for performing long-running or task-driven operations in the background. An example of this is a music playing application that defines a Service to continue playing music even when application context is given over to something different such as a web browser for navigating a website [2] .
Broadcast Receivers are components that help implement event-driven programming paradigms within Android. An application's Broadcast Receiver takes a defined action after it has received a specific Intent object (i.e., an event) broadcast by the system (e.g., the device completing its boot sequence) or by a user-defined broadcast.
Content Providers allow for a structured interface to the data that an application has created and stored in text files, SQLite databases, or any other persistent storage solutions. Utilizing this interface, other apps can query and potentially modify an application's data based on the behaviors and permissions defined by the provider. A common example of this is the default Contacts application. By providing a structured interface to the contact data stored by this app, other applications (e.g., an email app) can easily query names and addresses for use.
Intent objects are worth briefly mentioning for their role as the primary means for activating and passing data between all application components, with the exception of Content Providers. The Android Developers website specifies: "Although Intents facilitate communication between components in several ways, there are three fundamental usecases: (1) to start an Activity, (2) to start a Service, and (3) to deliver a Broadcast" [3] .
A. Application Security and Permissions
As described and detailed on the Android Developer website, applications are sandboxed from one another and are given access only to a narrow array of system resources. These accesses and the restriction of access to certain resources are implemented through multiple mechanisms. One of the mechanisms provided by the Android APIs is intentional lack of API support for certain sensitive functionality, such as directly manipulating the SIM card. Another mechanism is to place restrictions on access to sensitive resources through Android application permissions [4] .
For instance, access to the device's camera is protected using this permission mechanism. The same goes for location data (e.g., GPS), wireless network connections, SMS sending and reading, making phone calls, and enabling Bluetooth functionality. To use the protected APIs for accessing these sensitive resources or hardware features, an application must define and request the permissions it requires in its AndroidManifest.xml file, which is a control and configuration file required by all Android applications [5] . Many of our applications developed required simple permissions for accessing hardware sensors; however, not all applications did so and most were minimal in the number of permissions required.
III. ANDROID MALWARE ANALYSIS SERVICES
As the number of Android devices increased in availability and popularity, so too did the number of new applications being published in the Google Play Store. In December 2014, it was estimated over 23,000 new applications were introduced into the Google Play Store [6] . This large number of new submissions each month requires a scalable solution to analyze applications for malicious or benign behavior. Google recognized this early on and publicly announced the use of Google Bouncer, an automated service capable of scanning existing and newly submitted applications, in February 2012 [7] . Prior to Google Bouncer however, there were efforts both in commercial and academic realms to create similar sandboxing services. AASandbox was likely one of the first to do so [8] , and a recent publication also presented an excellent comparison of several of those tools and services [9] .
All of the analysis services we investigated provided some combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques. Additionally, the services all provided some sort of downloadable or web-accessible report based on their analysis of an Android application package (APK) submission. These reports highlighted various static or dynamic findings. Some services provided additional details such as network packet captures of traffic generated by the submitted APKs, or verbose Android log files based on the Android logcat tool. Each service provided search functionality across their reports, typically by MD5 hash signature.
Below is a listing of the Android malware services we utilized. Some services were not available (e.g., site unreachable/offline) during various phases of our testing, and Joe Sandbox specifically blacklisted our efforts at a certain point after informing us their Terms of Use prohibits attempts at enumerating runtime environment data.
• Android Sandbox
• Andrubis
A. Static Analysis Techniques
Static analysis techniques performed by the services we investigated typically involved unpacking the submitted APK file and parsing information from its AndroidManifest.xml file. Information provided from this action typically included Android permissions specified for the application and which application components were declared. For some services, this listing of application components was used to guide later dynamic analysis efforts in stimulating specific behaviors.
As part of the static analysis, most services also attempted to convert Android DEX files back to the Java.class files from which they were derived. Open source tools such as dex2jar were likely used for this process. The majority of the services we investigated also performed some hash-based signature comparisons against known malware in repositories such as VirusTotal.
B. Dynamic Analysis Techniques
In the services we investigated, dynamic analysis was performed in a variety of environments and at differing inspection levels. The inspection levels included analysis done fully outside the Android OS (i.e., at the hypervisor level), strictly within the Dalvik virtual machine running the application, or some blend of both. Most service frameworks were likely setup on QEMU hypervisors based on our findings of various services utilizing default Android SDK Virtual Devices (AVD) as foundations for their runtime environments. At least one service indicated physical devices were sometimes used in a distributed analysis approach.
Data taint propagation (commonly referred to as taint tracking) was used across several services to detect potential sensitive data leakage of items such as phone contacts and unique device numbers. TaintDroid is a popular tool for this and was identified as being used in several of the services we investigated.
Event stimulation-such as changing the emulator's GPS location, performing touchscreen presses, or modifying battery levels-was also used as a dynamic analysis technique in several services. Tools such as monkey and MonkeyRunner, which come as part of the Android SDK, were identified in some services as the primary way in which event stimulation was achieved. Other dynamic analysis techniques included method tracing, code coverage comparison, monitoring of system level calls, phone call and SMS event monitoring, network traffic captures, and file access logging.
IV. ENVIRONMENT ENUMERATION
Our tests focused on exploring how Android malware analysis services attempt to emulate not only physical hardware features (e.g., location data from a GPS receiver), but dynamic resources on a phone as well (e.g., contacts, call logs, SMS, etc.). By enumerating and observing what data values and attributes were provided (or not provided), we hoped to discern noticeable differences between analysis services and physical devices that would aid in our detection and evasion techniques.
A. Methodology
Each Android application we developed attempts to capture basic data values and attributes of a sensor, hardware feature, or other dynamic resource. These data values and attributes are directly accessible through proper Android API method calls and, when required, proper Android permissions declared in the AndroidManifest.xml configuration file. We did not attempt to circumvent or exploit any Android platform feature for purposes of these tests.
To account for differing API levels supported by the seventeen physical devices and nine analysis services tested, we were required to support Android API levels 8 through level 21.
In order to capture results of the tests being performed by each application, we setup an Amazon EC2 instance running a basic Apache web server with PHP. Each application included method calls to perform HTTP POST requests to our EC2 instance, with all results being stored in name-value pairs. Simple PHP scripts on the server parsed out POST parameters and wrote them to individual log files for later retrieval via SFTP.
Each proof-of-concept application had a unique APK for physical devices we tested and for the analysis services. The only difference across the versions for an individual proof-ofconcept application was the URL chosen for submitting the data values and attributes via HTTP POST parameters. This also provided us with separate MD5 hash values for each application built per malware service.
In addition to sending all results to our EC2 instance via HTTP for logging, results were displayed on the Android device or emulator screen using an Android TextView object. Several of the services provided screen captures of submitted applications during runtime as part of their resulting report, so this served as a secondary measure for capturing data generated from each service. 
B. The SensorList Application
As stated on the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) website: "Android sensors give applications access to a mobile device's underlying physical sensors. They are data-providing virtual devices defined by the implementation of sensors.h, the sensor Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)" [10] .
Data provided by these virtual sensors typically comes from a device's corresponding physical hardware features onboard such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, barometers, humidity sensors, pressure sensors, light sensors, and proximity sensors.
Each Android sensor has an associated sensor type, which is accessed via the Android API Sensor.getType method call. Official Android sensor types are defined in sensors.h (currently 28 official types) and are documented within the Android SDK APIs, describing what data attributes and methods can be called utilizing that sensor [10] . Manufacturers implementing Android on their devices may utilize hardware not defined by Android open-source specifications and therefore assign new temporary types to support corresponding sensors [10] . Our testing of the SensorList application on physical devices also gave evidence to this.
The SensorList application we created makes use of the android.hardware.SensorManager and android.hardware.Sensor APIs. After instantiating a SensorManager object, a for-each loop iterates across the available sensors, adding the sensor type and the sensor namevalue pair to a java.util.List object, which was used for sending the HTTP POST requests to our EC2 server.
C. SensorList Results and Discussion
Our results provided several insights based upon what sensors were listed as being implemented by each physical device and each individual malware analysis service (as depicted in Table I ).
First, none of the services implemented any manufacturerspecific sensor types (i.e., unofficial sensor types with numbers above 28-not depicted in Table 1 ). Each physical device tested had at least one manufacturer-specific sensor type, with the LG Nexus 5 implementing eight different ones. Additionally, five of the eight malware services provided the exact same five sensor types: GEOMAGNETIC_FIELD, ACCELEROMETER, ORIENTATION, TEMPERATURE, and PROXIMITY. The other services provided one or zero sensor types as implemented. On average, the physical devices gave results indicating 10 different implemented sensor types. Unsurprisingly, the aforementioned five sensor types are exactly the same five sensor types provided by an Android SDK default virtual device (AVD), which we confirmed by running SensorList in a default AVD. This suggests the runtime environments for these services are likely built upon a default-provided AVD as a starting foundation. Further, the number of implemented sensor types on physical devices does not appear to be correlated to age as even the oldest models running Gingerbread (v.
Additionally, none of the physical devices we tested provided the TEMPERATURE sensor type (it has been deprecated for some time now); however, five of the analysis services did.
Lastly, the sensor names associated with each of the sensors provided by the malware analysis services all began with the string "Goldfish". For instance, the VisualThreat sensor name for its accelerometer is "Goldfish 3-axis Accelerometer", whereas the Samsung Galaxy S4 sensor name for its accelerometer is "K330 Acceleration Sensor". This Goldfish string is likely another artifact left over by the analysis services building upon the Android default AVD as a starting foundation for their runtime environments.
D. The LocationGPS / LocationNetwork Applications
The Android platform provides developers two separate methodologies (i.e., framework APIs) for accessing and utilizing location data (e.g., GPS, cell tower, or Wi-Fi location). Their recommended method for utilizing location services is via the recently published Google Location Services API, part of Google Play Services [11] . This method requires developers to include the additional Google Play Services SDK while building their applications. Devices (or emulators) that run location-aware apps using Google Location Services API require Google Play Services to be installed on the device. For two of the more common Android emulators (the default Android SDK emulator and GenyMotion), this presents problems since Google Play Services is not installed by default, nor can it be easily installed based on our testing. The second (and more traditional way) of accessing and utilizing locational data is via the android.location API. This is the method we chose for developing our LocationGPS and LocationNetwork applications.
At a high level, the android.location API has three primary classes for dealing with location attributes and information:
Location, LocationManager, and LocationProvider. All locations generated by a LocationManager are guaranteed to have a valid latitude, longitude, and timestamp; other parameters like accuracy or altitude are optional for a given location generated [12] . In addition to the higher-level API classes for utilizing location data, our LocationGPS application makes use of the GPSSatellite API for accessing attributes of the satellite data received when a GPS location fix is obtained.
In both our applications, a LocationManager is instantiated first and then the isProviderEnabled method is called to verify that a GPS or Network LocationProvider is available on the device or emulator executing the application. If the provider is enabled, getLastKnownLocation is called to determine whether any current locational data is available without waiting for new updates from the provider. New location and GPS satellite updates for the provider are caught by event listener methods and are displayed onscreen and then sent to our EC2 instance.
E. LocationGPS / LocationNetwork Results and Discussion
Our results provided several insights based upon whether the dynamic malware services emulated locational data, how accurate that data was, and what attributes were associated with the locational data (as depicted in Table II for only the LocationGPS app).
The first noticeable dynamic heuristic was that none of the analysis services provided more than one locational update when location providers were enabled. During executions of the LocationGPS app on the most modern four physical devices, multiple new location updates were provided usually within a short period of time (i.e., under a minute).
Although it is feasible the GPS receiver on a device could be turned off or could lose signal immediately after one update, we feel confident that the testing for multiple location updates in a short period of time would allow for detection of an emulated runtime environment, specifically when a GPS location provider is initially enabled.
The same assertion is harder to make when locations are generated from a Network provider. Location updates may not happen if a device's location is associated with a Wi-Fi access point and it never leaves the access point's proximity. Our testing of the LocationNetwork app shows this when the four tested physical devices never receive additional updates while connected to the same wireless network.
The next noticeable heuristic showed all locations generated by GPS providers in the analysis environments lacked any satellite data attributes. In fact, when an analysis environment provided a GPS location, the number of satellites used in the location fix was zero. In contrast, all four physical devices we tested provided all satellite data attributes and the location fixes for each device ranged between six to twelve satellites being used.
Another noteworthy heuristic was how believable the locations generated by GPS or Network providers were. Of the three GPS locations obtained, one service gave coordinates in the ocean off the coast of Somalia (Mobile-Sandbox), another gave coordinates in the middle of the Arabian Sea (SandDroid), and a third service gave coordinates in Antarctica (CopperDroid), as shown in Fig. 1 . Interestingly, ANDRUBIS and TraceDroid both provided the exact same location data (using a Network provider). The latitude and longitude for this location placed it near an urban location in China.
Also noteworthy was how much accuracy was given in the latitude and longitude values. Most values went out to 14 or 15 decimal places; however, SandDroid's locational data gave latitude of 14.0N and longitude of 64.0E (i.e., only a single decimal).
The last dynamic heuristic we observed was the value provided by the Location.getTime method for each location obtained. Both ANDRUBIS and TraceDroid provided a value of 1342232104000, which equates to 14 July 2012 02:15:04 UTC. CopperDroid provided a value of 1343174400000, which equates to 25 July 2012 00:00:00 UTC. SandDroid provided a value of 1417449600000, which equates to 01 December 2014 16:00:00 UTC. Only, Mobile-Sandbox's value was reasonably accurate at 1423036800000, which equates to 04 February 2015 08:00:00 GMT (approximately one month prior to our app testing).
Although we submitted APK files to each of the nine analysis environments at least twice, further submissions would likely provide more accurate results. For instance, initial submissions for CopperDroid did not result in any location information, yet later submissions did. This was similar across several services and likely indicated different runtime environments being used for scaled analysis, including physical devices vice emulated environments. android.hardware.SensorEventListener APIs provide access for capturing new sensor events (i.e., changes in sensor values) and the corresponding data for the sensor that caused an event to trigger. Our accelerometer application instantiates a Sensor object of TYPE_ACCELEROMETER, provided the runtime environment has an accelerometer sensor available. If one is available, the generic sensor data is displayed and logged to our EC2 server.
The onResume Activity life cycle callback method registers the SensorEventListener for capturing new sensor value changes, and the onSensorChanged event method keeps track of how many sensor events happen prior to displaying and logging event data to our EC2 server.
G. Accelerometer Sensor Results and Discussion
Our results provided several insights based upon whether the dynamic malware services emulated accelerometer data, how accurate that data was, and what attributes were associated with the data (as depicted in Table III) . The most significant dynamic heuristic discovered during our testing was that each attribute showed the same values across all analysis services that provided sensor event updates. Another significant dynamic heuristic discovered during our testing was the vendor name associated with each accelerometer sensor. The four physical devices tested had vendor names of InvenSense (Samsung Galaxy S5, Samsung Galaxy Note 4, LG Nexus 5) and STMicroelectronics (Samsung Galaxy S4). All analysis services provided a vendor name of The Android Open Source Project.
Other noteworthy dynamic heuristics discovered were associated with sensor power values and sensor maximum range values. The power consumption indicated by the accelerometer sensor on each of the physical devices was less than or equal to 0.4 milliamperes (mA), while each of the analysis services indicated a power consumption of 3.0 mAroughly 7.5 to 12 times the value of the physical devices. The sensor maximum range value for each of the analysis services was 2.8 m/s 2 -a value significantly lower than the physical devices' maximum sensor range (with 19.6 m/s 2 being the lowest of those).
More telling, however, is that the maximum value of 2.8 m/s 2 given by the analysis services suggests incorrect implementations. Values given along the y-axis at 9.77622 m/s 2 are above this maximum value (and were likely implemented so as to be close to the force of gravity, thereby suggesting a device at rest).
Interestingly, the Android Sandbox analysis service gave sensor attribute data but did not provide any actual sensor updates based on accelerometer value changes. Additionally, CopperDroid was thought to implement an accelerometer based on our findings after executing the SensorList application; however, no device or sensor data was logged to our EC2 server. It is possible in both cases the analysis services executed our application, generated accelerometer data, and for some reason did not send the data across their networks or that the data was interrupted in transit. Network packet capture (pcap) data provided by each of the analysis services' reports gave no further insight.
V. ANDROID EMULATOR EVASION
Both Android applications we developed for evasion testing first attempted to capture basic values and attributes of sensors, hardware features, or other dynamic resources. These values and attributes are directly accessible through proper Android API method calls and, when required, proper Android permissions declared in the AndroidManifest.xml configuration file.
Both applications attempt to determine if they are executing on a physical device, and, if so, retrieve the device's unique ID (i.e., its IMEI, ESN, or MEID value) and send that value to our EC2 server. If the application determines it is executing in an emulated environment, it will not send the device's unique ID. Of note, sending the device's unique ID is a common trend associated with malware and aggressive spyware, as described in [13] and evidenced in a profile of the famous NickiSpy.A malware instance detected in 2011 [14] . Results are shown in Table IV and Table V . The empty columns indicate where each analysis service failed to pass the corresponding sensor or resource test, as described by row heading footnotes. 
A. KonamiCode Application (Static Version)
The first version of the Konami Code application we developed focused on testing runtime environments against known static attribute values based on our enumeration findings. For example, in testing the accelerometer sensor, we compared attribute values such as its max range, power, and vendor name. We chose nine different tests to perform involving various values from the SensorList, Accelerometer, Geomagnetic Field, Orientation, Proximity, Battery, Bluetooth, Audio, and PhoneState applications. Each test is called sequentially from the onCreate Activity method, and if any one of them fails then the application will not send the device's unique identification number to our EC2 server. Our results show each physical device successfully executes our psuedomalware action (i.e., sending the device's IMEI to our server), while none of the dynamic malware services execute the same action.
B. KonamiCode Application (Dynamic Version)
The second version of the Konami Code application we developed focused on testing runtime environments against known dynamic attributes and their behavior over multiple events. For example, in testing the accelerometer sensor, we compared whether given force values along each of the three axes ever changed over the range of ten accelerometer sensor events. We chose three different sensor types for testing (Accelerometer, Geomagnetic Field, and Proximity).
Unlike the static version of the Konami Code application, we could not perform tests in a sequential manner because we had no control over which sensor event occurred at any given time. Instead, any time a sensor event was detected, we determined what sensor type caused it and then looked to see if the values given by this event differed from the previous event values for that sensor type. If they differed, the assumption became that the runtime environment was a physical device. If they remained the same across ten distinct sensor events of a given sensor type, we stopped testing that sensor and assumed the runtime environment was an emulated environment. Our results show each physical device successfully executes our psuedo-malware action (i.e., sending the device's IMEI to our server), while none of the dynamic malware services execute the same action.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. Summary
We presented a survey of sensor and resource use on a corpus of seventeen physical Android devices and eight Android malware analysis services. To accomplish this goal, we developed fifteen different Android applications that captured various sensor and resource attributes, in addition to dynamic values associated with sensor and resource events. The initial implementation results showed a striking contrast where typically 10 sensors were implemented on physical devices as compared to five in emulated services.
Utilizing the results from these fifteen applications, we explored our next goal of creating triggering techniques to perform pseudo-malware actions, or to detect and evade emulated Android runtime environments. To do this, we created two separate applications based on (1) comparing static attributes of sensors and resources with known emulated values, and (2) monitoring the dynamic behaviors of sensors within the runtime environments.
Our final results from these two applications demonstrated how trivial it is to detect and evade emulated runtime environments utilized by several popular Android malware analysis services. Each physical device we tested executed our pseudo-malware action, while each analysis service tested was successfully evaded.
B. Related Work
Although our research was not seminal in nature, we do feel it contributes to an ongoing area of interest within the mobile security community. Foundational work in 2012 by J. Oberheide and C. Miller discussed several ways they were able to fingerprint Google's Play Store Android Bouncer and its analysis environment, as well subsequent methods for evading its runtime analysis [15] . At the time of our testing, Android Bouncer did not allow outbound network traffic to pass their network perimeter, thereby eliminating any ability we would have at logging behaviors from that environment. Interestingly, Google recently moved to include human review for all applications submitted to the Play Store for publication [16] .
Work presented in 2014 at EuroSec detailed how various heuristics from static, dynamic, and hypervisor (i.e., the virtualization software itself) attributes could be used for analysis evasion [17] . We tested similar online services, and our research extends this work by exploring and detailing additional sensor and data sources within Android runtime environments that could be used for analysis evasion.
C. Future Work in Countering Anti-Analysis Techniques
Because our research demonstrated how easily emulated mobile environments can be detected and evaded, we believe future work in the area of mobile malware should explore multiple methods of countering anti-analysis techniques.
One such method would be to concentrate on better simulation for sensor events and other hardware events (e.g., battery status, GPS, etc.). We recently came across a program called SensorSimulator, which reportedly can simulate realistic values on an Android emulator and has the ability to store and replay sensor event data from actual physical devices.
The most promising method we encountered while concluding our research came from SandDroid's creator, Wenjun Hu. At the 2014 PacSec conference in Tokyo, he advocated for implementing API runtime hooks within an emulated environment to intercept malicious malware attempting to detect the runtime environment [18] . These runtime hooks would then allow analysis environments to provide simulated results in a lightweight manner, as opposed to modifying Android source code.
